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                                                                                     ABSTRACT 
The hidden-variable theorems of Bell and followers depend upon an 
assumption, namely the hidden-variable assumption, that conflicts with the 
precepts of quantum philosophy. Hence from an orthodox quantum 
perspective those theorems entail no faster-than-light transfer of 
information. They merely reinforce the ban on hidden variables. The need 
for some sort of faster-than-light information transfer can be shown by using 
counterfactuals instead of hidden variables. Shimony’s criticism of that 
argument fails to take into account the distinction between no-faster-than-
light connection in one direction and that same condition in both directions. 
The argument can be cleanly formulated within the framework of a fixed 
past, open future interpretation of quantum theory, which neatly 
accommodates the critical assumptions that the experimenters are free to 
choose which experiments they will perform. The assumptions are 
compatible with the Tomonaga-Schwinger formulation of quantum field 
theory, and hence with orthodox quantum precepts, and with the relativistic 
requirement that no prediction pertaining to an outcome in one region can 
depend upon a free choice made in a region spacelike-separated from the 
first. 
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Asher Peres has had a long-standing interest in the subject matter of this 
article, and I have benefited for numerous communications with him on this 
topic. The form of this paper is in part a consequence of his insightful 
demands for mathematical rigor combined with conceptual clarity in the 
approach to fundamental issues. 
 
 
1. NEED TO IMPROVE BELL’S NO-LOCAL-HIDDEN-VARIABLE 
THEOREMS 
Professor Shimony’s article[1] is an extremely helpful contribution to the 
subject. It summarizes in a lucid way the large areas of agreement between 
us, and provides a back-to-basics proof of the two propositions that are the 
main technical results of my paper[2]. Shimony’s long and detailed 
derivation of those two basic propositions should lay completely to rest all 
but one of the objections that were raised against my more compact 1997 
proof[3]. I shall examine presently that remaining objection, but first will 
emphasize some key points of agreement mentioned by Shimony.   
 
Shimony identifies the motivation of my work, namely the fact that the 
theorems of J.S. Bell[4] and his followers[5] rest explicitly or implicitly on the 
local-hidden-variable assumption that the values of the pertinent 
observables exist whether they are measured or not. That assumption 
conflicts with orthodox quantum philosophy, and that fact undermines the 
idea that some sort of faster-than-light transfer of information is implied by 
the conjunction of Bell’s theorem and the assumed validity of the predictions 
of quantum theory. The more likely conclusion, from the orthodox 
perspective, is a failure of the hidden-variable assumption. The orthodox 
interpretation of Bell’s theorem is not that faster-than-light transfer of 
information exists. It is rather that the hidden-variable assumption is false. 
Shimony notes that a proof not requiring a hidden-variable assumption of 
the need in quantum theory for faster-than-light information transfer “would 
be a profound scientific and philosophical achievement.” 
 
2. SHIMONY’S OBJECTION AND THE FIXED PAST, OPEN FUTURE 
APPROACH 
Shimony questions the sufficiency of my reasons for supplementing my 
1997 proof with the 2004 version[2]. He examines, consequently, not my 
new proof but rather the explicitly counterfactual approach that I proposed in 
a published reply to his earlier comments. That approach differs 
fundamentally from the one used in my 2004 paper, but his proof of the 
validity of the two propositions covers both formulations. 
 
The proof constructed and criticized by Shimony lies within the general 
framework of counterfactual reasoning, whereas my 2004 proof, although 
retaining some of the trappings and language of counterfactual 
argumentation, is based on a substantially different foundation. The 
combination of my assumptions of “free choices” and of “no backward-in-
time influence” amounts to the assumption that theories covered by my new 
work are to be compatible with the idea of “fixed past, open future”.  This 
conceptualization circumvents, at the foundational level, the need for 
counterfactuals. It accords with the notion of an advancing “now” in which 
events occur that “fix and settle” first the free choice made by any agent 
about which experiment he will perform, and later the outcome of that freely 
chosen experiment. The future is “open” in the sense that the choices in 
regions R and L of which experiments are to be performed in those regions 
are required to be treatable, within the theory, as free choices that are made 
by the agents when the moment ”now” arrives. The subsequent “choice of 
the outcome of the freely chosen experiment” is likewise required to be 
treatable, within the class of theories to which the propositions apply, as 
undetermined until the advancing moment “now” arrives, at which time the 
outcome also becomes “fixed and settled”.  These latter choices are termed 
“nature’s choices” and are required to conform to the statistical rules of 
quantum theory.  Treating the theory in this way is supposed to be one 
adequate way of expressing the content of the theory, although perhaps not 
the only possible way.  
 
This switch from an approach formulated in the framework of 
“counterfactuals” to one formulated in the framework of “fixed past, open 
future” has no significant effect on the proofs of the two propositions. But it 
brings the concepts being used into closer accord with those of orthodox 
quantum thinking. Although philosophers contend that counterfactual 
concepts pervade science, and are needed for science, the significance of 
results based on the use of counterfactuals remains somewhat shakey in 
the minds of most quantum physicists. But the idea that the events already 
observed in the past by somebody can be treated as if they are fixed and 
settled, and that our future choices can be treated as if they free, agrees 
with the way that physicists deal with their theories, with their theoretical 
practices, and with their lives in general.  
 
Shimony’s objection to my argument begins with the assertion “But SR is 
not an assertion about actually occurring events. It is a counterfactual 
conditional “.  This statement alone activates the intuitive distrust of 
scientists in arguments based on counterfactuals. I shall deal presently with 
Shimony’s specific objection, raised within the framework of the 
counterfactual formulation. But first I shall describe the application of the two 
propositions from the “fixed past, open future” point of view that is more 
congenial with the normal thinking of physicists. 
 
Why does Shimony claim that the validity of these two propositions lacks 
scientific significance?  
 
This wording is not exactly the way that Shimony put it. But scientific 
significance is the basic issue. The theorems of Bell and his followers are 
ultimately of value because they rule out certain possible models or theories 
of nature. The pertinent questions are thus: Does the joint validity of the two 
propositions rule out some models or theories of nature that are not ruled 
out by Bell’s theorems? And does the joint validity of these two propositions 
rule out all of the local-hidden variable theories that are eliminated by Bell’s 
theorem?  If the joint validity of these two propositions does indeed rule out 
all of the hidden-variable theories covered by Bell’s theorem, and others 
besides, then these propositions are jointly stronger than Bell’s Theorem, 
both because their consequences are stronger—they rule out more 
theories---and also because their assumptions are weaker. In this 
connection it is important to notice that it is not nature that is required to 
conform to the assumptions. It is rather that a theory must, in order for these 
propositions to be applicable to that theory, be such that the choice made by 
the experimenter in the later region R can be treated as a free variable, 
effectively undetermined until the moment of the decision, and that whatever 
outcome has already been observed in the earlier region L can be 
considered to remain undisturbed by the subsequent events. The premises 
of the two propositions are thus conditions on the class of theories to which 
these propositions apply. 
 
To see how this works, suppose you are trying to construct a local theory 
that agrees with the predictions of Quantum Theory. Then what has been 
proved is that if this theory is merely such that (1) the experimenter’s 
choices can be considered “free” (i.e., without any relevant causal roots), 
and (2) what is observed to happen in region L can be considered to be 
fixed and settled independently of whether R1 or R2 will later be freely 
chosen and performed by the experimenter in region R, and (3) the 
predictions of quantum theory for the Hardy experiments are valid,  then the 
theory must, for these experiments, satisfy the following two properties: 
 
I. If L2 is performed in L, then if R2 were to be performed and were 
to give outcome + then if R1 were to be performed, the outcome 
would always be --. 
 
II   If L1 is performed in L, then if R2 were to be performed and were 
to give outcome + then if R1 were to be performed the outcome 
would sometimes be +.   
  
I have eliminated here the counterfactual terminology that was employed in 
my counterfactual-based 1997 paper, and that was retained in my 2004 
paper for the sake of historical continuity. I have adopted here the language 
appropriate to the assumptions of my 2004 paper, which, as emphasized 
above, are concordant with the idea of fixed past open future. The two 
propositions pertain to the structure of a theory in which the free variables 
are the open choices to be made by the experimenters as to which 
experiments will be performed, and the two propositions are assertions 
pertaining to relationships that then follow from the combination of the 
assumption of the validity of the relevant predictions of quantum theory, 
together with the idea that the outcomes that have already been observed 
by some human witness in one region can be treated as fixed and settled, 
completely unalterable by subsequent free choices made in a region space-
like separated from the first.     
 
Although something akin to hidden variables might be entailed by these 
propositions, any such structure is here a consequence of our fixed past, 
open future assumptions, together with the assumptions of the predictions 
of QM. These consequences are not hidden-variable assumptions.  
   
These two propositions, taken together, entail the presence in region R of 
information about the free choice made in L between L1 and L2: 
no theory that satisfies these to propositions can be “local” in the sense that 
it is logically compatible with an exclusion of all faster-than-light transfers of 
information. 
 
No local-hidden-variable theory can satisfy both of these properties: In such 
a theory the observable properties are fixed and definite whether they are 
measured of not, and they do not depend upon which experiment is chosen 
and performed far away. That combination of conditions is not compatible 
with the validity of these two propositions.    
 
No Bell-type hidden-variable assumption has entered into the proof of the 
two properties. These two propositions are consequences simply of the 
assumptions that the theory is compatible with the theoretical concept of 
“fixed past, open future”, in conjunction with the validity of predictions of 
quantum theory for this Hardy-type experiment.  
 
Relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT) is compatible with the premises of 
the propositions. This is shown by the works of Tomonaga[6] and 
Schwinger[7] (T&S), where an advancing surface “now” is a parameterized 
space-like surface σ(τ) such that for τ’ ≤ τ the surface σ(τ’) lies nowhere later 
than σ(τ), but is somewhere earlier. In the T&S formulation there exists a 
fixed history of the evolution of the state vector Ψ(σ(τ)) for all σ(τ’) up until 
the present time “Now”. In that formulation there is also, in association with 
the fixing of any outcome, a change of the state vector ψ(σ(τ))  that 
produces an instantaneous transfer of information along the space-like 
surfaces σ(τ).  But in spite of the existence within the T&S formulation of 
RQFT of this instantaneous information transfer along space-like surfaces, 
all the predictions of the theory about outcomes of measurements conform 
to the requirement of relativity theory that no such prediction pertaining to an 
experiment performed in one space-time region can depend upon which 
experiment is chosen and performed in a second space-time region that is 
situated space-like relative to the first.  
 
The fact that the T&S formulation of RQFT does involve faster-than-light 
information transfers does not by itself entail that the existence of such 
transfers is an intrinsic feature of RQFT itself. There are other formulations 
that focus directly on connections between observables, and in which no 
trace of faster-than-light information transfer is evident. However, 
application of the two propositions requires merely that theory under 
examination be “compatible with” the concepts of “fixed past, open future”, 
in the sense that, without altering the content of the theory, the choice 
between R1 and R2 can be treated as free, and the outcome of the earlier 
observation in L can be treated as fixed and settled prior to the fixing of the 
later choice in R  The validity of this assumption is entailed by the T&S 
formulation of RQFT, and hence RQFT itself is covered by arguments 
based on the propositions..  
 
The general conclusion is that no theory that can be treated in accordance 
with the idea of fixed past, open future, and that accords with the quantum 
predictions for the Hardy experiments, can be reconciled with a locality 
requirement that bans all faster-than-light transfer of information.  
 
3. AN ILLUSTRATION 
To illustrate the argument let us consider a complex model. Suppose in 
region R there is a genie who receives the particle, and extracts information 
from it, which he then combines with some random numbers, and with the 
information about which experiment, R1 or R2, is being performed in R, and 
then issues the output information in accordance with some unstated rules, 
which, however, lead to results concordant with the predictions of quantum 
theory.  Without making any further assumption about what the rules are, 
beyond the assertion that the free choice between R1 and R2 made in R 
cannot disturb what has already become fixed and settled in L, we know 
that if the experimenter in L chooses to perform L2 then the genie’s rules, 
whatever they are, must entail a special connection between the outcomes 
that he would issue in the two alternative cases R1 or R2.: If, in some 
instance, the agent in R were to choose R2 and the genie were to choose + 
then if in that instance the agent were to choose R1, the genie must 
definitely issues the outcome – .  On the other hand, that same rule cannot 
always be obeyed if the experimenter in L chooses L1. But this difference 
means that information about whether L1 or L2 was chosen in L must be 
present in R: the genie located in R cannot issue outcomes that depend 
upon the choice between L1 and L2 made by the experimenter in L if no 
information about that free choice in L is available in R.   
 
If no information about the free choice between L1 and L2 can get to R, then 
this genie-model is ruled out. But it is not ruled out by Bell’s theorem: Bell’s 
hidden-variable assumptions are stronger than those of the genie-model. 
Indeed, if one simply replaces the genie with “a localized process” then the 
assumptions of that model are compatible not only with quantum 
philosophy, but with relativistic quantum field theory itself. Thus my results 
yield conclusions that are not entailed by the theorems of Bell and his 
followers. They express in the form of a pair of specific propositions an 
important feature of all theories that seek to go beyond the mere expression 
of correlations between observations: they must reject either the idea that 
our choices can be treated as free, or the notion that there is no faster-than-
light (including backward in time) transfer of information, if they are to give 
the quantum predictions for the Hardy-type experiments    
 
4. SHIMONY’S OBJECTION 
We now turn to the two key questions:  
 
1. Does Shimony’s argument reveal any flaw in this fixed-past-open-
future argument? 
2. Does Shimony’s argument reveal any flaw in the corresponding 
counterfactual-based argument? 
           
          
  
I shall argue that the answer to both questions is No! 
 
Shimony asserts that “The error in Stapp’s argument is his claim that SR is 
a statement about region R alone”, But what I actually said, as he correctly 
recorded, was that “the truth or falsity of SR is defined by conditions on the 
truth or falsity of statements describing possible events located in region R”. 
This difference in wording is significant. My argument, given above, is based 
on my wording: I displayed two propositions that both follow from the stated 
assumptions, but that are---because of the fact that their truth or falsity is 
defined by conditions on the truth or falsity of statements describing events 
located in R--jointly incompatible with a ban on transfer of information to R 
of the choice between L1 and L2 made by the experimenter in region L. 
Shimony treats the entire statement SR, which involves counterfactuals, as 
a unit that incorporates, within itself, my key assumption that what 
happened in L was fixed and settled before the decision between R1 and 
R2 was made, whereas I take this key assumption to be a restriction on the 
class of theories within which the pair of propositions is proved to be true.  
 
This latter approach of taking the stated assumptions to be conditions on 
the class of theories in which the two propositions are jointly true is a direct 
and completely legitimate way to proceed. Incorporating the key assumption 
of no-backward-in-time influence into the meaning of a counterfactual 
statement is less satisfactory for two reasons. In the first place the mere use 
of statements about events that in principle can never happen, because 
some contrary thing has been asserted to have definitely happened tends 
by itself to render the argument less than ideally rock solid in the minds of 
physicists. On the other hand, speaking directly about properties of a class 
of theories that satisfy certain specified conditions that are themselves in 
line with quantum philosophy, and are actually satisfied by relativistic 
quantum field theory, is a far more transparent approach that is less likely to 
enshroud subtle difficulties. The second reason is the closely connected fact 
that the scrambling the key causality assumption into the meaning of the 
words that express contrary-to-fact assertions opens the door to possible 
confusion. 
  
The essential point here is that one must be careful not to introduce any 
assumption that injects implicitly into the theory the transfer of information 
from L to R that the joint validity of the two propositions reveals to be 
present. Shimony’s criticism possesses a certain initial aura of credibility 
due to the fact that introducing any causal connection between events in R 
and in L harbors the danger of injecting implicitly some hidden assumption 
of the very influence from L to R that the argument eventually reveals. If a 
hidden assumption of an influence from R to L is smuggled into the 
assumptions then the fact that such a connection eventually emerges would 
lack significance.. On the other hand, if no such assumption is smuggled in, 
and the conclusion that there must be transfer of information from L to R 
follows logically from completely legitimate assumptions, including, in an 
essential way, the pertinent predictions of quantum theory, then the 
conclusion pertaining to the theories in question must be deemed to be 
logically valid. 
 
It is well-know that quantum theory is completely compatible with the 
absence of faster-than-light influences in one direction, provided such 
influences are allowed in other directions. The question at issue is whether 
one can simultaneously forbid faster-than-light influences in all directions. 
Hence if we wish to prove the need for faster-than-light influence in some 
direction then we can legitimately proceed by excluding faster-than-light 
action in one direction, say right to left, and then showing that this restriction 
entails, when combined with the assumption of the validity of pertinent 
predictions of quantum theory, the need for faster-than-light transfer of 
information in the other direction, namely from left to right. This is the 
completely legitimate line of argument that I employ. 
 
The first part of this legitimate argument is implemented by my assumption 
that the earlier observed outcome in L is fixed and settled, independently of 
what the later free choice in R will be. This assumption of not a hidden 
assumption of the existence of an action from left to right. It is the 
completely legitimate-in-this-context demand that there be no action from 
right to left. This assumption, by itself, does not entail any influence from left 
to right. Only when combined with the predictions of quantum theory does it 
lead to the conclusion that there must be information transfer from left to 
right.  Thus the requirement of no action from right to left, whether regarded 
as a condition on the class of covered theories, or as part of the meaning of 
SR, is completely legitimate, in the context of this proof. But Shimony’s 
analysis does not distinguish this completely-legitimate-in-this-context 
assumption of no action from right to left from what would be a completely 
illegitimate assumption of action from left to right.  
 
The logical structure of the proof---with the two very different statuses of (1) 
the input assumption of no action from right to left and (2) the resulting 
output conclusion of a necessary transfer of information from left to right --- 
is revealed far more clearly and directly in the fixed-past-open-future 
formulation of the conditions for applicability of two propositions than in an 
approach that mixes counterfactual concepts into the meanings of the words 
appearing in the proofs. If that latter approach is used, then it is necessary 
in principle to unpack the counterfactual statements in order to clearly 
distinguish between legitimate inputs and possible illegitimate ones. 
Shimony’s counterfactual-based analysis fails make this crucial distinction. 
In lieu of making this distinction within the counterfactual approach, the 
alternative and simpler way to verify the validity of the basic claim is to work 
directly from the assumptions of my 2004 paper, in the way described 
above, and thereby circumvent the complexities introduced by the avoidable 
use of counterfactuals.  
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